A 59year old man with a persistent history ofsexual abuse ofchildren has requested castration to stop himselffrom reoffending. Dr Malcolm Alexanderpresents the man's case and highlights some ofthe ethical issues, and three psychiatrists and a lawyer comment on the request.
Mr K is a 59 year old man with a long history of persistent sexual abuse against children. His abusive behaviour began when he was at school and continued into his marriage. He abused his own children, and, despite many periods of imprisonment, he continued to abuse children each time he was released. His last period of imprisonment was for 10 years.
During that last period in prison Mr K became determined to end his abusive behaviour and formed the idea that orchidectomy would solve his problem by curtailing his sex drive. He petitioned the prison doctor to this end and received his support. After his release Mr K was referred to a psychiatric hospital and admitted for assessment for several months.
While he was in hospital Mr K was offered chemical castration using goserelin but refused this because he regarded it as a temporary and incomplete solution. He wants a permanent solution to stop his abusive behaviour so that he can start to live a normal life. He is convinced that the operation will work and liberate him from his condition, which he compares to that of being a "leper." He feels desperate for surgery and threatens suicide. To support his campaign for castration Mr K has been on a hunger strike and has also contemplated castrating himself.
The issue of consent has also been carefully considered and the view has been formed that Mr K is capable of using his judgment to come to a sound opinion. The Mental Health Act Commission has concluded that Mr K's ability to give consent is fundamental and that in addition the opinion of a number of experts should be sought and a decision made on the basis of the consensus view.
When Mr K discusses the impact of abuse on his victims he freely admits that "it ruins a child's life," but he claims not to be aware of the long term consequences and psychological damage that abuse of children may have when the child grows up into an adult. Mr K's obsession with castration sits oddly in a culture that is committed not to use surgery to change or alter behaviour-perhaps with the exception of oophorectomy and hysterectomy in women with severe premenstrual tension and for people having sex changes. A surgeon might be convicted for assault should he or she perform this operation unless a body of medical opinion supported the surgeon's decision to operate.
Mr K has perhaps another 20 years in front of him. I wonder whether the indecisiveness of the medical establishment will create a living hell for dozens more children, while it refuses to accept Mr K's own, extreme, solution. Instead the clinicians offer the uncertainty of goserelin, a treatment he rejects and which is therefore unlikely to work. The other altemative is imprisonment, a just solution if he reoffends but which does not face up to the need for our society to develop effective strategies to prevent child abuse or to treat persistent offenders when they are released from prison.
There is no dilemma for Mr K, who feels that castration is a perfect answer for himself and society. There is no known "cure" for the obsessive abusive behaviour he displays, and, despite Mr K's strongly held view about castration, society has rightly drawn fairly clear boundaries that distinguish between therapeutic surgery and mutilation. If a body of medical opinion supported Mr K might it become a dangerous precedent for acts of mutilation to be carried out at the behest of the courts or even the media? On the other hand, perhaps the solution is simply to comply with the wishes of a dangerous individual who passionately wishes to change himself and protect society. The use of chemical agents to suppress libido in sexual offenders who are judged to be at risk of committing serious crimes is an established practice provided that the offender gives his consent. The three agents most commonly used are cyproterone acetate (a synthetic antiandrogen given orally), medroxyprgesterone acetate (a progestogen given intramuscularly), and goserelin (a synthetic luteinising hormone releasing hormone given subcutaneously). All these can be highly effective in suppressing libido, although none are without side effects, particularly at the doses that may be required.
In Denmark surgical castration was a common treatment for serious sexual offenders until 1972. Several studies have shown that reoffending was dramatically reduced.'2 However, offending is not eradicated completely and a few castrated men still experience significant sexual desire and retain the ability to have an erection. Broadly speaking, the effects of surgical castration on libido are comparable to those that can be achieved by chemical means.
"Surgical castration does not remove all responsibilityfrom him" Furthermore, surgical treatment can produce similar, though possibly less severe, side effects.
A recent study on the treament of prostatic cancer suggests that a maximal reduction of libido might be achieved by combining an antiandrogen with either a luteinising hormone releasing hormone agonist or surgical castration. ' When psychological and behavioural programmes have failed and when chemical suppression of libido has been unsatisfactory, most commonly because of unacceptable side effects, there may be a case for surgical castration. Castration is not a panacea, however, and an antiandrogen could be added if troublesome sexual feelings remained. There is no overriding clinical reason to proceed to surgery without first trying the chemical suppressants.
If a patient for whom surgical castration was proposed suffered from a mental disorder (sexual deviancy is specifically excluded from the category by the Mental Health Act 1983) then it would be necessary, in addition to the recommendation of the responsible medical officer and the consent of the patient, to have a second opinion from an independent doctor appointed by the Mental Health Act Commission.4
In this particular case it seems odd that a man desperate for suppression of his libido will not contemplate a therapeutic trial of one or other of the chemical agents available. If he is not clinically depressed and seeking mutilation as a punishment he probably thinks castration is a total solution to his problems. Unfortunately this may prove not to be the case, but so long as he understands that surgical castration does not remove all responsibility from him for his subsequent sexual behaviour I would be inclined to support his request. The fact that he will not pursue the more orthodox course advised by his doctors testifies to his personality difficulties and suggests that even after castration he will continue to be a problem to himself, even if not to others. Thus although the Danish, Dutch, and German studies' 24 could be regarded as showing that castrated men did particularly well-because they were formerly established recidivists-we must set against that the fact that they were also exceptionally highly "motivated" for the operation.24 Ortmann presented evidence that, with similar motivation, the results of treatment with cyproterone acetate are better.5 Motivation for change may thus be the key, but Mr K has rejected what is probably the best approach to the control of his sexual drive. He has, it seems, also refused to consider other, psychological treatments which might eventually allow him a safe return to a healthy hormone balance.
The single most important issue for Mr K's future is whether he can ever become capable of genuine negotiations with others. At the heart of his sexual problems is this inability since, for sexual acts, he picks on those who are barely able to know their wishes, let alone express or stand by them. Thirdly, a patient's choice may be subjected to certain legal conditions. An example is the requirement of medical approval and certification of consent (by a doctor and two others) imposed by the Mental Health Act 1983 for psychosurgery and for the surgical implantation of hormones to reduce male sexual drive.
The implantation of hormones to reduce sexual drive is relevant to the problem facing Mr K and his doctors. An apparent altemative to orchidectomy is chemical castration by goserelin. The Divisional Court ruled in 1989 that goserelin is not covered by the requirements of the Mental Health Act on surgical implantation of hormones as a treatment for mental disorder.3 The chemically castrating effect of goserelin therefore remains a matter of simple agreement between doctor and patient, while the implantation of natural hormones, which are not as effective, involves no less than seven people (including the patient) in a complex consultation process.
In the case of treatment for mental disorder, section 118 (2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 empowers the secretary of state to allow limited consultation (one doctor to certify both therapeutic benefit and consent) for treatments that "give rise to special concern." The secretary of state has chosen not to include goserelin in this category in the revised code of practice coming into effect on 1 November. Had she done so and chemical castration been recommended to Mr K as a treatment for mental disorder, legal recognition of special concern might have approximated such treatment to orchidectomy. But goserelin has not been included, and, furthermore, neither treatment option for Mr K is apparently directed to mental disorder. Goserelin is thus a far cry from invasive, irreversible orchidectomy. This only adds to the dilemma of patient and doctors alike.
Application might be made for a judicial declaration that orchidectomy is lawful in this case. The casuistry of such litigation depends on medical opinion ofwhat is appropriate. The best interests approach is often taken without specifying which interests are the best or who decides.4 Despite its limitations the best interests approach is in any case better suited to decisions concerning treatment of incapable patients than it is to decisions denying treatment to a patient in full possession of his mental faculties.5
Legislation and case law offer analogies both for and against performing orchidectomy. The decision in the case of Mr K could be made by a judge, by an ethics committee, or simply from an informal second opinion. Mr K, however, might justifiably expect his problem to be resolved not by asking why his desired operation should be performed but rather by asking why it should not if his autonomy and desire not to reoffend are to be respected. When different health care interventions are not expected to produce the same outcomes both the costs and the consequences of the options need to be assessed. This can be done by cost-effectiveness analysis, whereby the costs are compared with outcomes measured in natural units-for example, per life saved, per life year gained, and per pain or symptom free day. Many cost-effective analyses rely on existing published studies for effectiveness data as it is often too costly or time consuming to coliect data on cost and effectiveness during a clinical trial. Where there is uncertainty about the costs and effectiveness of procedures sensitivity analysis can be used, which examines the sensitivity ofthe results to alternative assumptions about key variables. In this article Ray Robinson describes these methods of analysis and discusses possibilities for how the benefits of alternative interventions should be valued.
If the outcomes of altemative procedures or programmes under review are the same, or very similar, then attention can focus upon the costs in order to identify the least cost option. The method of evaluation for this-cost-minimisation analysis-was described in last week's article. If, however, the outcomes are not expected to be the same, then both the costs and consequences of altemative options need to be considered. Cost-effectiveness analysis is one method of economic evaluation that allows this to be done.
Measures ofeffectiveness
In order to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis it is necessary to have suitable measures of effectiveness. These will depend on the objectives of the particular interventions under review. In all cost-effectiveness analysis, however, measures of effectiveness should be defined in appropriate natural units and, ideally, expressed in a single dimension.
Common measures used in several studies have been "lives saved" and "life years gained." Thus Boyle and colleagues, in their study of neonatal intensive care of very low birthweight babies, measured effectiveness in terms of mortality rates at the time of discharge of newborn infants from hospital.' Their study compared two periods-one before the introduction of neonatal intensive care, and one after its introduction-and measured cost effectiveness in terms of additional costs per life saved. Both Ludbrook2 and Churchill and colleagues3 investigated alternative treatments of end stage renal disease and measured their effectiveness in terms of life years gained. A similar measure was adopted by Mandelblatt and Fahs, who reported that the early detection of cervical cancer through Pap tests saved 3-7 years of life per 100 tests and represented a cost of $2874 per life year saved.4 Oster and Epstein also used years of life saved as a measure of effectiveness in their study of antihyperlipaemic therapy in the prevention of coronary heart disease.5
Several other measures ofeffectiveness have been used by different researchers (box). These have included the number of pain or symptom free days resulting from alternative drug regimens in the treatment of duodenal ulcers6; the number ofpatients with a successful diagnosis in the case of alternative diagnostic strategies for deep vein thrombosis7; the number of complications avoided in the treatment ofLyme disease after tick bites8; and the number of episodes of fever cured and deaths prevented in the treatment of chloroquine resistant malaria in African children.9
Most of the above studies express effectivenesss in terms of a single dimension and thereby permit direct comparison between altemative procedures in terms of their marginal cost per unit of outcome. Sometimes, however, the alternatives under examination have multiple outcomes. None the less, many of these choices can be dealt with within the cost-effectiveness analysis framework. Thus if one procedure emerges as less costly and of equal or greater effectiveness than all the other options on each dimension of effectiveness, it is clearly the most cost effective option. For example, Percival and Setty, in their comparison of day surgery with ovemight inpatient care for cataract surgery, measured outcomes in terms of the number of both operative and postoperative complications, and in terms of visual acuity of patients three to six days and 10 weeks to six months after surgery.'0 Patient satisfaction was also elicited through a questionnaire. As day surgery emerged as the more effective option on
